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Abstract:
This paper analyses how collective bargaining affects the level and structure of labour
and capital taxes in OECD countries by using cross-country-time-series data. Corpora-
tist countries are found to have higher effective labor taxes on average during the 1970-
1996 period. Effective capital taxes, in turn, are higher in the countries where union
membership is higher. Estimation results suggest that reduction in the effective labor
taxes decreases unemployment only in the unionized countries with decentralized wage
bargaining. The capital taxes have only a small distorting effect on per-capita GDP
growth, but there is no conclusive evidence on neither direct or indirect effect of the
labor taxes on growth. Small or non-existent distortionary effects of capital and labour
taxes on growth can be due to the potential efficiency gains arising from redistributive
taxation. Potential efficiency gains of redistribution are supported by the finding that
inequality seem to have a negative effect on per-capita GDP growth.
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Tiivistelmä: Tässä tutkimuksessa analysoidaan työmarkkinoiden palkkaneuvottelujär-
jestelmän vaikutusta työ- ja pääomatuloverotuksen tasoon, sekä näiden verojen vaikusta
kasvuun ja työllisyyteen OECD maissa periodilla 1970-1996.  Paneeliaineiston esti-
mointitulokset osoittavat että efektiivinen työtulovero on korporatistisissa maissa kes-
kimäärin korkeammalla tasolla. Efektiivinen pääomavero on puolestaan keskimääräistä
korkeampi maissa, joissa työvoiman järjestäytymisaste on korkea. Tulosten mukaan
työtulovero vaikuttaa työttömyysasteeseen merkitsevästi vain maissa, joissa on liittota-
son palkkaneuvottelujärjestelmä.  Pääomaveroilla on pieni, mutta tilastollisesti merkit-
sevä vaikutus kasvuun.  Työtuloveron suuruudella sen sijaan ei ole tilastollisesti
merkitsevää vaikutusta kasvuun.
Asiasanat: Verotus, kasvu, työllisyys, ammattiliitot
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51 Introduction
In their seminal paper, Summers Gruber and Vergara (1993) suggest that labor
market institutions, a degree of corporatism especially, explains a large part of vari-
ation in government collected tax revenues in 14 OECD countries during the period
of 1955-1988. They argued in line with Olson (1965) that corporatist labor insti-
tutions recognize the linkage between the taxes that workers pay and bene¯ts they
receive in terms of public goods. In other words, corporatist labor unions see "be-
yond the budget constraint of the government". Consequently, labor taxes will have
smaller distortionary e®ects on labor supply than they have in situations where in-
dividual workers make labor supply decisions. More corporatist countries, then, also
prefer higher levels of labor taxation. Empirical analysis of Summers et. al. (1993)
suggested a linear positive relationship between labor tax revenues as a percentage
of GDP and the degree of corporatism.
This paper extends this discussion with political economy and tests two explana-
tions as to why high labor taxes and high capital taxes are preferred in the countries
with more centralized wage bargaining. We then estimate the e®ect of labor and
capital taxes on growth and unemployment during the period of 1970-1996 in 17
OECD countries. Our results with extended data set and di®erent tax variables are
in line with Summers, Gruber and Vergara (1993). We use e®ective labor tax rates1,
which measure better the overall burden of labor taxes and demonstrate with sim-
ple causal test that the degree of centralization in wage bargaining actually Granger
causes higher labor tax rates. Our results reveal also that this empirical relationship
has remained surprisingly robust across time.
We discuss in some detail the political economy of taxation and redistribution.
The theoretical literature suggests that in the countries with highly organized labor,
decisive voter belongs to the group where taxation is biased towards bene¯tting the
poor and/or to the group who does not own the capital. It is therefore not necessarily
the centralization of wage bargaining as such, but the in°uence that unions have
on the political decision making of taxation that drives the determination of taxes.
This political economy argument can most easily be reconciled in the relationship
between the union membership rates and e®ective capital taxes. Our results suggest
that the countries where the union membership has been higher, have also had higher
e®ective capital taxes.
After studying the determination of taxes, our study proceeds by discussing and
evaluating the economic impacts of taxation on growth and unemployment. The
recent empirical studies of European unemployment and growth suggest that the
size of the distortionary e®ects of labor taxes on unemployment and growth depend
0The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily re°ect the
views of the Government Institute for Economic Research and Bank of Finland
1See Data Appendix for details. However, notice that measurement and international compar-
isons of e®ective tax rates are not without problems. Carey et al. (2000) notes that while e®ective
tax rates represent more informative indicator of the burden and impact of tax systems than a
simple reliance on nominal (statutory) tax rates or tax revenue as a share of GDP, their calculation
raises several potentially signi¯cant methodological problems.
6upon labor market institutions, in line with the arguments of Summers, Gruber and
Vergara (1993). In more corporatist countries, labor taxes tend to have less distor-
tionary e®ect on unemployment than in the countries where wage bargaining is more
decentralized. In particular, distortionary e®ect of labor taxes on unemployment is
largest in the countries with industrial level wage bargaining systems. Daveri and
Tabellini (2000) ¯nd that the observed rise of about 14 percentage points in the
labor tax rate corresponds to a rise in unemployment of about 4 percentage points
in continental Europe during the last 25 year period. Also Nickell and Layard (1999)
report that overall tax burden on labor has a clear positive impact on unemployment
and labor supply. Daveri and Tabellini (2000) found that e®ects of capital taxes on
growth, instead, are negligible in all countries. OECD (1997) suggests that increase
in the average tax rate of about 10 percentage points over the past 35 years may
have reduced OECD annual growth rates around .5 percentage points.2
Our results support in general the earlier ¯ndings of Daveri and Tabellini (2000)
and Nickell and Layard (1997) regarding labor taxes and unemployment. We found
out that labor taxes have statistically signi¯cant e®ect on unemployment in the
countries with industry level bargaining system. However, our results do not con-
¯rm the empirical regularity between unemployment and growth as found in Daveri
and Tabellini (2000). Econometrics show that the relationship between unemploy-
ment and growth estimated in Daveri and Tabellini (2000) might be contaminated
by a larger outlier of Finland in the regression. After controlling for the e®ect of Fin-
land's dramatic and exceptional recession in the early 1990s from the cross-section-
time-series model yields no statistically signi¯cant relationship between growth and
unemployment for the rest of selected OECD countries3. Our results regarding the
relationship between capital taxes and output growth are somewhat sensitive to
di®erent speci¯cations of the model, but if anything, capital taxes seem to have
small distorting e®ect on output growth. Moreover, our results seems to suggest
that inequality is harmful for growth, supporting the view that redistribution can
potentially improve productive e±ciency and growth. Daveri and Tabellini (2000)
used somewhat di®erent speci¯cation of the growth model, but did not ¯nd clear
evidence on statistically signi¯cant e®ect of capital taxes on growth.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical
hypothesis as to why taxes are higher in the countries with more centralized wage
bargaining. Section 3 discusses primarily the theories that link labor and capital
income taxes on growth and unemployment. Sections 4 present empirical results
and section 5 concludes.
2Empirical evidence on the e®ects of taxes on growth is inconclusive, sometimes even opposite
to the plausible predictions of economic theory. See for instance Easterly and Rebelo (1993) and
Perotti (1996).
3Our empirical model, estimation period and the data is also somewhat di®erent to that used
in Tabellini and Daveri (2000) and might also contribute to our di®erent result.
72 Unions and determination of taxes
2.1 Internalizing externality
Unions can play an important role in the determination of taxes, basically in two
di®erent ways. In the ¯rst case, unions maybe considered as principal actors, be-
having monopolistically or negotiating wages with ¯rms. In the monopoly union
models a higher degree of centralization in wage bargaining leads into least tax
distortions, because of simple externality explanation: If unions are large enough,
they recognize a linkage between taxes and bene¯ts received, internalizing the ag-
gregate consequences of their actions.4 In the simple e±cient bargaining model of
Summers, Gruber and Vergara (1993) the bargaining game between unions and em-
ployers suggests that when unions are more encompassing, the distorting e®ects of
labor taxes declines, encouraging the use of labor taxes as means of redistribution.
Essentially their encompassing argument exploits the assumption that corporatist
unions recognize that their members represent a signi¯cant group of tax-payers and
hence bear the costs of reductions in the size of the tax base. In this way, large
enough unions internalize the government budget constraint in choosing wage and
labor input levels. We show in appendix B how this same e®ect can be rationalized
in a simple wage setting model with utilitarian unions. It is shown that corporatist
unions prefer higher labor taxes, but they distort the labor supply choice of the in-
dividuals less when compared to case where wage bargaining is decentralized among
monopolistically behaving unions. Moreover, if the government maximizes labor
tax revenues, it is shown that public spending is higher in the corporatist economies
when compared to countries with monopolistic wage setting.
2.2 The political economy
In the second approach, the mode of corporatism or unionism is included into the
model through political economy considerations. The idea is simple. When taxes
are assumed to be determined through political process, the political process leads
to the formation of tax ¯nanced social security systems that bene¯t lower income
workers. Formal models where the taxes are determined through political process
typically use one vote, one person idea, where the decisive voter belongs to 50th
percentile in the wealth distribution. Since it is typical that unions represent workers
with wealth lower than the average of all tax-payers and voters, powerful labor can
pursue its objectives through the political process, resulting the so called "negative
wealth bias". In such a situation the society would appear maximizing the welfare
of an individual, who belongs at lower than 50th percentile in wealth distribution.
Abstracting from many important dynamic considerations and trade-o®s between
growth, optimal accumulation of capital and employment, such a simple idea would
suggest that taxes are higher and more redistributive on average in the countries
4This has been discussed extensively by Calmfors (1994) and Rama (1994).
8with more powerful unions.56
Similar kind of political-economy interaction arises between the agents who dif-
fer in terms of sources of their income, rather than the initial level of wealth, as
emphasized in Bertola (1993). Political support for distributional policies, aimed
at enhancing investment led growth, depends crucially on the distribution of polit-
ical power across owners of accumulated (capital) and non-accumulated (physical
labor, land) factors of production, as well as a menu of policy instruments available.
Similarly, welfare e®ects of growth-oriented policies di®er between those who own
accumulated or non-accumulated factors of production. If non-accumulated factor
of production is identi¯ed as "labor" and the government redistributive instrument
was limited to direct factor income tax and subsidy, the stylized model of Bertola
(1993) would predict that the countries where political system would be biased to-
wards "labor" would exhibit lower growth. The median voter would purportedly
support low labor income tax and low capital income subsidy. On the contrary, if
the government could e®ectively use indirect consumption tax intended to increase
the rate of investment through investment subsidy, similar "labor bias" may lead to
support the redistributive scheme where investment led growth would be enhanced
by high consumption tax.
Whilst these theoretical results are model speci¯c and cannot not be general-
ized, Bertola's (1993) model emphasizes importance of dynamic linkages between
consumption decisions and growth in the political-economy setup. Factors that de-
termine empirical regularity between the wage bargaining institutions, labor taxes
and capital taxes are likely to be much more complicated than those based on simple
labor supply arguments given in Summers et.al. (1993). Whilst a simple external-
ity argument quite convincingly suggests that more corporatist countries with more
powerful labor exhibit higher labor income taxes, this same simple "static" argu-
ment should not be applied to capital taxation. When the dynamic linkages between
savings, capital accumulation and growth are correctly modeled in a more realistic
political-economy models with endogenous growth, there is necessarily a trade-o®
between consumption today and growth tomorrow. Consequently, extent to which
capital tax distorts private investment decisions and thereby growth is likely to
make capital taxes less appropriate instrument of redistribution, even in the coun-
tries with powerful labor.7Moreover, globalization and free movements of capital can
5See for instance Benabou (1999).
6Another plausible explanation why corporatism may lead into higher labour taxes and wage
compression is related to the insurance role of wage compression. Income protection programs ¯-
nanced by redistributive taxation may produce welfare gains for risk averse individuals, by reducing
the variance of disposable income (Diamond et.al. (1980) Eaton and Rosen (1980), Varian (1980)).
Agell and Lommerud (1992) have shown that such insurance bene¯ts from small compression of
the wage structure will outweigh any e±ciency losses imposed on the economy. When workers
are more uncertain about their future position in the wage distribution, the insurance demand for
wage compression is likely to increase. As the unions' bargaining power becomes so large that they
can e®ectively a®ect wage distribution, union members prefer "more egalitarian" wage policy and
vote for higher labour taxes that reduce variance of disposable income through di®erent income
protection programs.
7However, Persson and Tabellini (1999) suggest also that since capital is more concentrated
9e®ectively prevent signi¯cant di®erences in capital taxes across developed countries.
The same internal political economy forces that drive the determination of labor
taxes may therefore be weaker in the case of capital taxes. This seems evident from
the fact that even in the countries with fairly competitive labor markets, such as the
US, the U.K. and Canada capital taxes are not signi¯cantly lower compared with
European countries on average.
than labor income, a majority of the voters gain from shifting a larger share of the tax burden to
capital, despite the potential e±ciency losses.
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3 Economic e®ects of taxation
3.1 Depressed incentives, growth and unemployment
Institutions and economic mechanisms that contribute to the rate of economic
growth and unemployment rate have become increasingly active areas of research
and debate. The recent theoretical analysis relies primarily on endogenous growth
models where accumulation of human capital and its externalities are seen as central
driving forces of steady state growth. The contrast between the predictions of the
models based on representative agent and complete markets and the models with
heterogeneous agents and incomplete markets is sharp. Competitive models em-
phasize the distortionary e®ects of taxation, while the models with missing markets
emphasize the potential e±ciency gains arising from redistributive taxation.
For instance, in the model proposed by Lucas (1988), the human capital is accu-
mulated in the same manner as physical capital. In that model, the economy needs
to devote a certain fraction of investment to the accumulation of physical capital.
The steady state growth of output then coincides with the growth rate of physical
capital. Consequently, economic policy can actually a®ect the steady state growth
of the economy. Simply, any economic policy that in°uences savings decisions, or
allocation of consumption and investments of the individuals, also a®ects the steady
state growth. In particularly, these models demonstrate that direct capital tax
distorts the individuals' savings decision and therefore leads into a slower steady
state growth of the economy. These theoretical implications, then, have motivated
a common view that capital taxes should be avoided.8
Similarly, e®ects of labor tax on labor supply decisions, unemployment and
growth can easily be reconciled in the growth models with frictions in the labor
markets. A tax wedge between wages paid and received can lead into equilibrium
unemployment, as long as wages are not allowed to adjust accordingly. When labor
income taxes a®ect on unemployment, they can potentially in°uence also steady-
state growth. For instance, in the two period overlapping-generations-model with
monopolistic wage setting, as studied in Daveri and Tabellini (2000), higher equi-
librium level of unemployment implies higher capital-labor ratio and hence a less
productive capital stock. Consequently, lower rates of returns from capital yield
lower savings and hence lower growth rate per capita output. As a result, any factor
that increases equilibrium rate of unemployment, such as tax on labor, leads also
into a lower equilibrium growth rate of per capita output.9Their model also suggest
a negative relationship between output growth, investment and unemployment.
Taxes are usually used to ¯nance social insurance programs and their intertem-
poral disincentive e®ects through social security system need to be considered from
the viewpoint of individuals maximizing their life-time utilities. When bene¯ts of
social insurance are tied to the contributions there exist a social insurance sys-
8See for instance Feldstein (1995).
9These results rely of course critically on the presumed positive impact of interest rate on
savings. It has been noted e.g. by Nickell and Layard (1997) that empirical evidence on the
positive impact of interest rates on savings is inconclusive.
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tem, where present discounted value of individual's contributions equals present
discounted value of individual's bene¯ts. Consequently, payroll taxes that are used
to ¯nance earnings related social security in such an optimal system should have
little or no detrimental e®ect on labor supply and unemployment.
However, if social insurance system ¯nanced by the income or payroll taxes
"forces" individuals to save more than they otherwise would done, then the so-
cial insurance program will have e®ects on the labor market, even if the present
discounted value of bene¯ts equals that of contributions (Stiglitz (1999)). This dis-
tortion makes individuals worse o® and the income e®ect of the distortion leads to
increased labor supply and therefore unemployment.
Simple endogenous growth models based on complete markets are based on rep-
resentative agent framework where redistribution through social security programs
does not play a role. Typically, predictions of these models oversimplify the e®ects
of taxes since they do not recognize the consequences of redistribution, recently
emphasized in the literature of growth, inequality and coordination failures.
3.2 Redistribution, growth and unemployment
As discussed above, distortionary e®ects of taxation are due to depressed incentives
on savings and/or labor supply. However, the literature on growth and inequality,
initiated by Loury (1981), emphasizes the role of redistribution and potential e±-
ciency gains of redistributive taxation. Indirect evidence on the potential bene¯ts of
redistribution has been obtained from cross-country growth studies. Many empirical
studies suggest a negative relationship between inequality and growth, challenging
the old theories according to which wealth inequality should be growth enhancing
(Aghion (1999)).10 Empirical results are somewhat sensitive to di®erent speci¯ca-
tions of the estimated model and measurement of inequality. However, one can at
least say that it has become extremely di±cult to build a case that inequality is
good for growth. The negative relationship between inequality and growth has led
many economists to study the likely mechanisms behind this relationship.
Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994) suggested that in-
equality e®ects taxation through political process and individual voting behavior.
They suggest that individuals in more unequal societies would prefer more redis-
tribution. If inequality determines the extent of redistribution, inequality will have
indirect negative e®ect on the rate of growth of the economy, since redistribution
reduces incentives to save and invest. Therefore, the negative relationship between
inequality and growth would arise from interaction of political and economic factors.
However, there are two empirical objections to this argument. First, empirical evi-
dence from cross-country regressions, surveyed for instance in Bµenabou (1999), does
not support the hypothesis on direct negative e®ects of redistribution (shares of var-
10The traditional view argues that there is a fundamental trade-o® between productive e±-
ciency/growth and or social justice. Redistribution has both direct and indirect e®ect on growth.
On the one hand, it is thought to reduce di®erences in income and wealth, hence lowering the
growth. On the other hand, redistribution ¯nanced through income taxes diminishes the incen-
tives to accumulate wealth.
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ious transfers in GDP, average and marginal tax rates) on national investment rates
and growth. Second, empirical evidence does not support the political-economy
argument that more unequal societies would be more redistributive. The e®ect of
income distribution on transfers and taxes is rarely signi¯cant. Moreover, indirect
forms of redisribution tend to be lowest in United States, which has greatest pre-
tax inequality, and much more extensive in continental Europe or Japan (Benabou
(1999)).
Loury (1981) suggested that credit constraints prevent the poor households from
undertaking the e±cient amount of investment. With decreasing returns their
marginal product is higher and consequently, to the extent that redistribution re-
leases these credit constraints and that this e®ective is stronger than adverse e®ect
of taxation, taxes can contribute positively on total output or growth. Although
in the theoretical models the trade-o® between relaxing and depressive nature of
taxation depends on technological assumptions of the production process, timing of
taxation, availability of redistributive instruments, the degree of inequality of initial
resources etc. it is not di±cult to construct an example where redistribution through
taxation contributes positively on growth. Aghion (1999) summarizes much of the
subsequent literature and suggest three main reasons why inequality may have also
direct negative e®ect on growth: Inequality reduces investment opportunities, makes
borrowers incentives worse and generates macroeconomic volatility. 11
Benabou (1999) suggests that with missing credit markets representative agent
of the economy may fail to choose the most e±cient tax policy. Representative
agent in the economy is represented by the one with mean initial resources. Since
such agent is not interested in lending or borrowing {even if the capital markets
existed{ he is not interested in potentially e±cient redistribution. Consequently,
average agent in the economy may fail to internalize the social losses arising from
liquidity constraints and may therefore choose too low level of redistribution from
the society's point of view. Perotti (1992) provides some empirical evidence on the
role of credit frictions. Using the loan-to-value ratio for domestic mortgages as a
proxy for credit availability he ¯nds that greater credit availability has a positive
and signi¯cant e®ect on output growth . Similarly, the negative e®ect of inequality
on physical capital investment is enhanced by credit frictions.
When taxation is used to ¯nance social security systems and redistribution is an
issue, its e®ect on labor supply and therefore on equilibrium unemployment is not
that simple. Indeed, higher absolute levels of payroll taxes in Europe are mostly due
to higher level of social insurance. Stiglitz (1999) argues that the economic e®ects
of social insurance system ¯nanced by payroll tax do not arise from the system per
se, but from society's desire to redistribute. Redistribution drives a wedge between
present discounted value of contributions and bene¯ts. If the worker received no
bene¯t from the social insurance system the payroll tax drives a wedge between the
wage paid and the wage received. Therefore, high payroll tax would lead to high
11Another theory that links the growth and inequality suggests that when the gap between
rich and poor widens, the latter have a greater temptation to engage in rent-seeking or predatory
activities at the expense of the former. This can discourage accumulation and thereby growth (see
for instance Grossman (1991), Acemoglu (1995), Benhabib and Rustichini (1996).
13
levels of equilibrium unemployment in the competitive equilibrium.
Therefore, while redistribution in incomplete markets can be growth enhancing
when it e®ectively corrects market failures, the redistributive objective can also gen-
erate intratemporal distortion and distort the labor supply decisions of the agents
in competitive markets12 Indeed, some of the empirical evidence on the regularity
between unemployment and/or employment rates and generosity of social security
seem to suggest that individual and family employment rates are negatively and
rather signi¯cantly correlated with the generosity of welfare state in general (see for
instance Bertola et. al. (2000)).13 In particular, redistribution achieved through
progressive payroll taxation should decrease labor supply incentives for high-paid
workers. Whether this translates into worse growth performance depends then on
various technical assumption of the model and in particular, the assumed relation-
ship between unemployment and production e±ciency/growth.
3.3 The role of bargaining institutions
Bargaining institutions may have an important role in the pursuit of redistributive
goals and social policy of the government as well as their economic e®ects. Bargain-
ing institutions in°uence on the e®ectiveness of government intervention through
the wage determination process directly, but also indirectly through interactions of
economic and political factors. Corporatist unions may internalize the e®ects of
payroll taxes on labor costs and employment and the trade-o® between contribu-
tions and bene¯ts from tax ¯nanced public goods. This can potentially reduce the
intratemporal distortion arising from tax ¯nanced social security (Calmfors, 1994).
To the extent that more centralized wage bargaining systems/corporatist sys-
tems lead into redistributive scheme which internalizes social losses from liquidity
constraint and/or reduces inequality, corporatist countries may have higher taxes,
but they appear less distorting due to the e±ciency gains arising from redistribu-
tion . Moreover, in the corporatist countries, governments can devise income policy
arrangements that allow e±cient negotiation of wages, taxes and social security si-
multaneously. Corporatism may then bring along better targeted social security,
education and labor market programs that e±ciently correct market failures. These
may then result in e±ciency gains for the whole economy and show up as less distor-
tionary e®ects of labor taxation or in more general, better growth and employment
performance.14
12In the e±ciency wage theory, redistributive taxation generates implications very di®erent from
the basic competitive model however. If the goverment provides public goods which are valuable to
low income workers and taxation is progressive, it will reduce the discrepancy between the expected
utilities of being unemployed and those of being employed in high wage jobs. This reduces the
incentive not to shirk. Moreover, if the wages in the high productivity sector are determined
e±ciently, the sole e®ect of tax is to shift workers from the high productivity e±ciency wage sector
into the low productivity competitive sector.(Stiglitz (1999)).
13However, there are also countries with generous welfare state and high employment rates like
Sweden and Denmark. In these countries, the welfare programs and redistributive systems are
designed to support labour market participation (Lindbeck, 1997).
14Distortionary e®ects of taxation interact also with other features of labor markets. For instance,
14
Under the assumption of frictionless labor markets, competitive wage bargaining
would also yield favorable employment outcomes, as wages would adjust so as to
ensure that total labor costs are consistent with full employment. In principal, the
political system could design social policy interventions that would e±ciently correct
those market failures, that had no immediate consequences on the labor markets.
Consequently, social policy interventions can be compatible with high employment,
growth and wage restraint in widely di®erent labor market circumstances.
The familiar argument of Calmfors-Dri±ll (1988), that industry level bargaining
systems are detrimental to wage restraint and overall macroeconomic performance,
can be applied to social policy interventions as well. Small decentralized unions
that negotiate wages at industry level are strong enough to resist adverse changes
in their members take-home pay, but unable to collectively internalize the trade-o®
between contributions and bene¯ts from tax ¯nanced public goods.Open economy
considerations may of course °atten the Calmfors-Dri±ll curve, but it might still not
be implausible to expect that social policy interventions and therefore taxes, were
most distorting in the countries with industry level unions (Bertola et. al. (2000)).
imposition of social insurance system program ¯nanced by payroll tax necessitates a fall in the
before-tax wage. If there is a minimum wage in e®ect in low paid sector, that fall is not possible.
Hence, a payroll tax can potentiall result in an increase in unemployment if there is a minimum wage
(Stiglitz (1999)). With regard to growth dynamics, minimum wage laws can also be considered as
an indirect forms of redistribution.
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4 Econometric evidence
4.1 Determination of taxes
4.1.1 Labor taxes
After the theoretical discussion above, we turn to econometric analysis. The data
set covers slightly di®erent time periods and countries when compared to that used
by Daveri and Tabellini (2000). Daveri and Tabellini studied years 1965-1995 with
14 countries. This study concentrates on years 1970-1996 and uses a 5 year-average
periods, except for the last period where the averages have been calculated from
the 2 years period only (1995-96). We have updated the data set for e®ective tax
rates from OECD (1999) following the method of Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994)
and own calculations from revenue statistics and national accounts. Our dataset
includes 18 OECD countries, while Daveri and Tabellini (2000) used 14 OECD
countries. Also Nickell and Layard (1999) study the role of taxes and labor market
institutions on economic performance in 18 OECD countries with the cross-section
that covers periods 1983-1988 and 1989-1994. Daveri and Tabellini (2000) relied
primarily on the same method of calculating the tax burden on labor and capital,
while Nickell and Layard used Centre for Economic Performance (LSE) OECD data
set for payroll tax rate, total tax wedge and marginal tax wedge (OECD Jobs study
(1994)). Summers et. al. evaluated the relationship between corporatism and labor
tax revenues over GDP, rather than that between corporatism and e®ective labor tax
rates. Summers et. al. relied primarily on the original Calmfors-Dri±ll (1988) index
of corporatism. We use primarily the updated index of the degree of centralisation of
wage bargaining from OECD (1997) as well as the union density rates to characterise
labor market status of di®erent countries.
As suggested by Summers et. al. (1993) e®ective labor taxes tend to be higher
in the countries with more centralized or corporatist wage setting. Our simple es-
timation results indicate that this seems to be true. The results are also robust
do di®erent measures of centralization. Table 1. below presents OLS estimates on
regression explaining 5 year average e®ective labor tax rates by the degree of cen-
tralization in di®erent time periods for 17 OECD countries15. Inevitably a number
of observations in these regressions is too small to obtain very e±cient parameter
estimates and we do not exploit across country correlation structure of the errors in
estimation. These caveats in mind, however, it seems that the relationship between
e®ective labor taxes and the degree of centralization has remained robust over the
di®erent periods. Degree of centralization alone explains nearly 40% of the variation
in e®ective labor tax rates between the countries over the whole sample of 1970-1996.
15Due to few outliers, we estimated the equation also with outlier-robust estimation. Results
remained qualitatively the same.
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Table 1
Labor Taxes and the Degree of Centralization
Estimated Model
¿ i;l = ®+ µCi + ²i
Table of Results
Period ® µ R2 N
1970-1974 11.42 9.14 .28 16
1975-1979 8.18 12.917 .44 16
1980-1984 11.98 12.02 .37 18
1985-1989 12.83 12.87 .34 18
1990-1994 12.59 13.94 .30 18
1995-1996 16.47 12.48(a .30 17
1970-1996 13.35 11.25 .24 105
Notes: ¿ i;l is e®ective labor tax in country i. See appendix for details. Ci is a measure for the
degree of centralization in wage bargaining and ²i error term. OLS with robust standard errors
was used. a) Signi¯cant at 5% level. Otherwise, µ is always signi¯cant at 1% level. b) This is
between regression.
Simple regressions above do not prove a causal relationship between the degree
of centralization and labor taxes. However, the so called di®erence-in-di®erences
(DD) strategy 16 o®ers a simple way to estimate causal e®ects in panel data when
certain groups of observations are exposed to potential causing variable. This ap-
proach is particularly well suited to estimate the e®ect of sharp changes in economic
environment. This DD -estimator can be obtained from an estimate of the following
equation based on pooled observations for all countries and all years.
¿ it = °t + ®i + ±D + ²it (1)
¿ it is e®ective labor tax, °t is ¯xed time e®ects, ®i are the ¯xed country e®ects
and ²it are iid disturbances. D identi¯es the countries and times where the degree
of centralization in wage bargaining has changed. This indicator variable has been
de¯ned as
D =
8<: 0, if there are no changes1, if there is an increase in the degree of centralisation¡1, if there is a decrease in the degree of centralisation (2)
Parameter ± identi¯es the causal e®ect of centralization on labor taxes under the
assumption that changes in the e®ective labor taxes over time and across countries
16This method has been used for instance in Card and Sullivan (1988).
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are identical, unless there is a change in the degree of centralization. This assump-
tion is of course rather restrictive, as there may be many other factors that could
contribute diverging time patterns of the tax rates across countries.
Expected sign of this indicator variable is positive. Estimating this regression
yields a signi¯cant and positive coe±cient for the indicator variable D at 5% signif-
icance level. As it is well acknowledged in many other studies of the kind, outliers
contaminate the data and can yield spurious relationship between the variables.
When this same regression is repeated with outlier robust estimation17, signi¯cance
and magnitude of the indicator variable D is even larger. Signi¯cance of the indi-
cator variable is somewhat sensitive to assumed correlation structure of the errors,
but remains always signi¯cant at 10% level.
Table 2
Granger Causality between Labor Taxes and the Degree of
Centralization
¿ it = °t + ®i + 1:97
(0:94)
D
N = 18; T = 4:9
Notes: Estimation was done with ¯xed e®ects estimation. OLS standard errors are in paren-
thesis. °t and ®i indicates that common time e®ects and ¯xed country e®ects were regression
respectively.
4.1.2 Capital taxes
As argued in section 2, the relationship between labor market institutions and cap-
ital taxes is likely to more complex due to the apparent dynamic linkages between
savings, growth and investment and political economy forces and globalization. In-
deed, we did not ¯nd statistically signi¯cant relationship between centralization
and capital taxes. However, our results give some evidence that capital taxes and
density rates are positively related. High density rates do not necessarily imply
"high corporatism", nor do the low density rates imply competitive labor markets.
Higher density may rates proxy more closely the "political" power of labor, rather
than unions' organizational capacity to co-ordinate their wage demands. Countries
where the density rates are higher and therefore could be expected to have political
systems with negative wealth bias, have also had higher capital tax rates on aver-
age. The estimated simple linear relationship between capital tax rates and density
rates, however, is not as robust and signi¯cant as that between the labor taxes and
centralization discussed above.
17We used STATA in all estimations. STATA's outlier robust estimation procedure (rreg) was
used also for outlier robust estimation.
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Table 3
Estimated Model
¿ i = ®+ µDi + ²i
Table of Results
Period ® µ R2 N
1970-1974 20.97 .17 .03 17
1975-1979 19.63 .31¤ .1 17
1980-1984 25.50 .21 ¤ .13 18
1985-1989 23.81 .30¤¤ .24 18
1990-1994 27.31 .23¤ .28 18
1995-1996 30.60 .12 .19 17
1970-1996(b 24.62 .22¤ .27 105
Notes: ¿ i is e®ective capital tax rate in country i andDi is density rate. * and ** indicate that
the coe±cient is signi¯cant at 10% level and 5% level respectively. b) This is between countries
regression, which averages over the whole sample.
We used again DD -strategy to see whether density rate Granger causes the
capital tax ratio. Again, we de¯ned the indicator variable as
D =
8<: 0, if there are no changes in density rates1, if there is an increase in the density rate¡1, if there is a decrease in the density rate (3)
We obtained the following regression.
Table 4.
Granger Causality between Capital Taxes and Density Rates
¿ it;c = °t + ®i + 1:88
(0:732)
D
N = 18; T = 4:9
Notes: Estimation was done with ¯xed e®ects estimation. Standard errors in parenthesis. °t
and ®i indicate that both ¯xed e®ects and country e®ects were included in the regression.
Indicator variable is statistically signi¯cant at 5% signi¯cance level, implying
that increases (decreases) in density rates have contributed to higher (lower) capital
tax rates. Assuming that density rates would proxy the "negative wealth bias" our
results can be seen to give some evidence for the simple politico-economy hypothesis
that capital taxes are higher in the countries with higher unionization rates and
hence stronger unions.
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Figure 1: Degree of Co-operation and Centralisation in some OECD countries.
Source: OECD (1997)
4.2 Economic e®ects of taxation
4.2.1 Labor taxes and unemployment
After studying the determination of taxes in detail, we turn to analyze the economic
e®ects of taxation. We are primarily interested in how, and through which chan-
nel taxes e®ect on growth and unemployment and what is the role of bargaining
structure.
In order to focus on widely di®erent wage bargaining systems determining the
economic e®ects of taxation, we group the countries according to the degree of
coordination and centralization and use the density rate to characterize politico-
economic aspect of wage bargaining. Figure 1 below classi¯es the countries in 3
di®erent groups according to OECD estimates of the prominent level of wage bar-
gaining and the degree of coordination in wage bargaining. The same ¯gure also
indicates the changes that have occurred in the selected OECD countries towards
199518. We have combined these two measures of collective bargaining into one
single measure, which generically measures the degree of corporatism.
Following the discussion above we classify the counties in two di®erent groups.
First group contains the countries where wage bargaining is either corporatist or
competitive (low, medium) and the second group includes the countries with medium
18For more detailed discussion of these changes, see OECD (1997).
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or industry level bargaining system as indicated in ¯gure 1. The ¯gure 1 clearly
indicates that there have been changes in some countries during the 1990s.19 As
discussed above, we expect that labor taxes are more distorting in the industry level
bargaining systems, when compared to the ¯rst group. Grouping countries only in
two groups allows us to have relatively large number of observations in both groups.
We start from a very simple regression for unemployment and estimate the model
for both groups in ¯rst di®erences as follows
¢uit = ®+ °t + ¯1¢¿
l
it¡1 + ¯2¢½it¡1 + ²it (4)
where ® is constant , °t are common time e®ects, ¢¿
l
it is e®ective labor tax
rate lagged one period and ¢½it¡1 is replacement ratio of unemployment bene¯ts
lagged one period. Replacement ratio in the unemployment equation proxies the
generosity of unemployment insurance systems in di®erent countries. It is expected
that more generous unemployment insurance systems generate e±ciency costs for
the economy due to their wage e®ects and disincentive e®ect to job search. Also,
with generous unemployment insurance, unemployment is not as costly, so unions
are expected to push for higher wages, resulting higher unemployment. Estimating
the relationship between unemployment, labor taxes and replacement ratio in the
¯rst di®erences allows us to abstract from other ¯xed country e®ects that have been
found important in the previous studies of labor market institutions and level of
unemployment. Moreover, estimating the model in the ¯rst di®erences allows us to
avoid a possible spurious relationship arising from the possible common time trend
between the variables. E±cient labor tax rates are also likely to be endogenous at
least partly with respect to unemployment because of measurement method, which
is based on aggregate data. In order to avoid, at least partially, bias of the estimated
coe±cients, we therefore estimate the model with one period lag in tax rates and
replacement ratios. Results from the OLS regression without time lags are not very
di®erent from those reported below.
Assumed covariance structure of ²it in the cross-section-time-series model often
signi¯cantly a®ects their standard errors. More e±cient parameter estimates can
be obtained by using Feasible Generalized Least Squares estimation method, which
corrects for panel-heteroskedasticity, possible serial correlation of the errors and
contemporaneous correlation across panels. However, Beck and Katz (1995) show
by Monte Carlo simulations that FGLS standard errors are massively overcon¯-
dent when the time series dimension (T ) is small relative to cross section dimension
(N). This biases inference since null hypothesis is rejected too often. An alter-
native method, provided by Beck and Katz (1995) and implemented for instance
in STATA 6.0 uses Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) parameter estimates and recon-
structs variance-covariance matrix from OLS residuals by using repeated observa-
tions of contemporaneous correlations across time. This procedure yields estimate
of the variance-covariance matrix, which is closer to its true value when T to N ratio
19For more detailed discussion of these changes, see for instance OECD (1997)
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is small. Compared to traditional ¯xed e®ects and random e®ects estimators the
Beck and Katz method yields variance-covariance matrix which reaches its asymp-
totic properties as T approaches in¯nity. On the contrary, ¯xed e®ects and random
e®ects estimators reach their asymptotic properties as N approaches in¯nity. Since
in our data N > T and both of them relatively small, however, ¯xed e®ect or ran-
dom e®ects estimators are likely to yield the standard errors that are closest to true
values.
Tables 5 and 6 provide estimated regression results from random e®ects model
for the two country groups. Our simple regressions clearly suggest that labor taxes
are more distortionary in the countries with medium or industry level bargaining
when compared to countries with competitive or corporatist wage bargaining. The
coe±cient for e®ective labor tax rates is not statistically signi¯cant in the countries
with competitive or corporatist labor markets. This is in sharp contrast to positive
and statistically signi¯cant coe±cient in the countries with industry level bargaining
systems, as shown in table 6. While the coe±cient for replacement ratio is positive
in both country groups, implying that higher replacement ratio would yield higher
unemployment, the coe±cient is statistically signi¯cant only in the countries with
competitive or corporatist countries.
Table 5.
Changes in Unemployment Rates and E®ective Labor Taxes in the
Countries with Competitive or Corporatist Labor Markets
¢uit = °t + :76
(:824)
+ :12
(0:155)
¢¿ lit¡1 + :15
(0:051)
¢½it¡1 + ²it
R2 = :32
Â2H(5) = 3:18
Â2P¡B(1) = 0:07
T = 3:7; N = 12
Notes: R2 refers to overall ¯t of the regression Â2H(:) refers to Hausman (1978) test and
Â2P¡B(:) to Breusch and Pagan (1980) test for constant variance. T is average number of obser-
vations per panel (country) and N is number of countries in regression. OLS estimation method
with semi-robust standard errors was used. °t refers to the fact that common time e®ects were
also included in the regression.
The panel is slightly unbalanced and there are few outliers that may bias the
results. In order to check for the seriousness of the outlier problem we estimated
the same model by using outlier-robust estimation20. Estimated coe±cient for labor
tax rate remained insigni¯cant, but so did the estimated parameter for replacement
ratio. Estimating the same model without time e®ects does not signi¯cantly change
the basic results, but yields marginally signi¯cant coe±cient for replacement ratio
also in the outlier-robust estimation.
20Outlier robust estimation was implemented by STATA with the estimation command rreg.
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When the same model is repeated for the countries with industry level wage
bargaining structure, the results change signi¯cantly. This is evident from the table
6. The results reported below are based on the regression with common time e®ects
and semi-robust standard errors. The results are somewhat sensitive to inclusion or
exclusion of time e®ects and assumed correlation structure of the errors, but nev-
ertheless, estimated coe±cient for labor taxes is always higher and more signi¯cant
than the one reported above.
Within this group of countries, Spain is obvious outlier with very high unem-
ployment rate. We therefore estimated the model with outlier-robust estimation.
Estimated coe±cient for labor tax dropped down to .23, and it remained signi¯-
cant only at 12% signi¯cance level. We estimated the model below also by directly
controlling for Spain with the dummy variable. Results remained closely similar to
those reported below. Although the results below can be somewhat contaminated by
outliers and measurement biases, our results support the view that rather signi¯cant
reductions in unemployment can be achieved by reducing labor taxes in countries
with industry level wage bargaining systems.
Table 6.
Changes in Unemployment Rates and E®ective Labor Taxes in the
Countries with Industry Level Bargaining Structure
¢uit = °t + 1:79
(:571)
+ :29
(0:143)
¢¿ it¡1;l + :13
(0:096)
¢½it¡1 + ²it
R2 = :32
Â2H(6) = 2:89
Â2P¡B(1) = 3:47
T = 3:3; N = 11
Notes: R2 refers to overall ¯t of the regression Â2H(1) is Hausman misspeci¯cation test and
Â2P¡B(1) is Breusch and Pagan test for constant variance of the error component. T is aver-
age number of observations in the panel (country) and N is number of countries in regression.
OLS method with semi-robust standard errors was used. This method corrects for within-panel
correlation and heteroskedasticity in the errors and is closely similar to random e®ects model.
Classi¯cation of the countries according to degree of centralization and co-
operation is of course somewhat arbitrary. We therefore estimated the same re-
gression for all countries, but included interaction term between density rates and
changes in labor tax rates. When both parameters for changes in labor taxes and
replacement ratio were allowed to vary with density rates, the interaction terms did
not become signi¯cant, however. On the contrary, if we allow only the replacement
ratio vary with density rates, changes in labor tax rates become signi¯cant in all
countries at 5% signi¯cance level. However, the random e®ects model does not pass
the Breusch-Pagan test for constant variance of the error component, implying that
random e®ects model is misspeci¯ed. Estimated parameters for replacement ratios
are also very badly determined in these regressions.
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4.2.2 Growth and taxes
Let us now turn to the relationship between growth and taxes. Modelling growth
within cross-country regression is more complex than the previous analysis of unem-
ployment. Many cross-country growth regressions estimated in the literature have
been criticized due to their ad hoc nature21 and sensitivity of the results to various
speci¯cations and di®erent samples of countries. We make no exception regarding
ad hoc nature of our regression.
We started from following speci¯cation of the growth equation
¢yit = ®+ °t + ¯1¿
c
it + ¯2¿
l
it + ¯3¢uit + ¯4yi70 + ¯5¢
50¡10
it + ²it (5)
where ¢yit is output growth in country i at time t; ® is constant °t are common
time e®ects, ¢uit is change in unemployment rate, yi70 is initial per capita output
in 1970 and ¢50¡10it is decile ratio, based on income of 50th and 10% percentile.
Inclusion of initial per capita income captures the convergence hypothesis implied
by many formulations of neo-classical growth models. Decile ratio proxies the di®er-
ences in income distribution. Introducing inequality into growth regression captures
the direct e®ect of inequality on growth as discussed above.22
¿ cit and ¿
l
it are capital and labor tax rates respectively. Introducing both labor
and capital tax rates into growth regression enables us to assess the direct e®ect of
these two tax rates on output growth. According to traditional view, capital taxes
should contribute negatively on growth. However, higher capital taxes subsume the
redistributive objectives of the government and may therefore partially mitigate the
distorting e®ect on growth as discussed in section 3.23
Capital and labor taxes are likely to su®er from measurement errors and en-
dogeneity. In order to at least partially avoid endogeneity bias, we use directly
instrumental variable estimation and treat tax rates and unemployment endoge-
nous. We use lagged changes in unemployment, taxes and replacement ratios as
instruments.
We choose to include unemployment into the growth regression in di®erences,
while leave tax rates in levels. When taxes are introduced into growth regression in
levels, it allows us to directly test the hypothesis whether output growth has been
distorted by higher taxes. This speci¯cation seems to work better than keeping both
tax rates and unemployment rates in levels. Introducing unemployment in levels into
growth equations induces more serious serial correlation of the errors than using ¯rst
di®erences. In addition to taxes and unemployment, we control for di®erences in
initial per capita output and cross-country di®erences in income distribution.
21For a good general discussion, see for instance Temple (2000).
22Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997) provides a good discussion on the trends in Earnings and
Income Inequality, as well as problems associated with cross-national comparisons.
23Our growth equation is di®erent from that estimated by Daveri and Tabellini (2000). Daveri
and Tabellini controlled for initial schooling, while we control for inequality. Moreover, they
included only capital tax rate in their equation and used either levels or ¯rst di®erences of the
right hand side variables.
24
Estimating the above general model with instrumental variable method yields
following regression
Table 7
Growth Regression
-Initial Speci¯cation
¢yit = °t ¡ :01
(:188)
¿ cit ¡ :01
(:017)
¿ lit ¡ :37
(:157)
¢uit ¡ :52
(:388)
yi70¡ 1:74
(:555)
¢50¡10it + ²it
R2 = :36
F (3; 46)D¡M = 1:81 (:159)
Â2(2)OIR = 2:70 (:260)
NT = 58
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis F (:)D¡M is Davidson-MacKinnon test for
unbiasedness of OLS estimated parameters. Â2(:)OIR is Sargan test for validity of instruments
and NT is total number of observations. °t refers to the fact that time e®ects were included into
regression. Tax rates and change in unemployment rate were instrumented with their one period
lagged values and lagged changes in the replacement ratios. Constant not reported.
Our main interest is in the statistical signi¯cance and magnitude of e®ective tax
rate variables. Fit of the growth regression as speci¯ed above is rather poor and
estimated coe±cients for tax rates are of expected sign, but never statistically sig-
ni¯cant in the instrumental variable regression. In the ¯rst speci¯cation, estimated
coe±cient for changes in unemployment rate is negative and statistically signi¯cant
from zero. However, closer inspection reveals that this results is contaminated by
large outlier of Finland in the regression. Excluding Finland from the regression or
controlling for the dramatic drop in output in Finland during the 1990-1994 period
makes the coe±cient for the change in unemployment insigni¯cant. Estimated coef-
¯cient for initial per capita output is negative24 but not signi¯cantly di®erent from
zero, while decile ratio, that measures income inequality is negative and statistically
signi¯cant. In order to check the sensitivity of this result to di®erent measures of
inequality, we used also decile ratio between 90th and 10th percentile as well as
Theil's measure of inequality. Estimated coe±cients were always negative, but they
were somewhat less signi¯cant. It seems that the model estimated above is not
well speci¯ed, since after controlling for outlier of Finland, only inequality remains
sign¯cant. We therefore proceed towards more parsimonious model.
24Assuming that countries are technologically the same, the negative coe±cient implies that the
poorer countries will grow faster during transitional period. The reason for this is that relatively
poor economy has higher marginal product of extra capital and therefore, for a given rate of
investment, its growth will be faster.
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4.3 Parsimonious model and alternative speci¯cations
We next experimented with sequential dropping of the insigni¯cant variables. We
¯rst dropped the changes in unemployment from the regression25. This resulted
signi¯cant coe±cient for the capital taxes at 5% signi¯cance level and its coe±cient
went down to ¡0:03. Inequality measure remained signi¯cant and negative at 1%
signi¯cance level, while initial level of output became insigni¯cant. We next dropped
the labor tax variable. Initial level of output became signi¯cant and the coe±cient
for capital tax rates remained signi¯cant and its value changed to ¡0:02: Compared
to our initial regression given in table 726, this speci¯cation seems to work better.
We report this regression below
Table 8
Growth Regression
-Parsimonious Speci¯cation
¢yit = °t ¡ :02
(:008)
¿ cit ¡ :69
(:392)
yi70¡ 1:17
(:435)
¢50¡10it + ²it
R2 = :45
F (3; 46)D¡M = :94 (:335)
NT = 73
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis F (:)D¡M is Davidson-MacKinnon test for
unbiasedness of OLS estimated parameters. NT is total number of observations. °t refers to the
fact that time e®ects were included into regression. Capital tax rates were instrumented with one
period lagged values and all the exogenous variables. Step dummy variable for Finland during the
period of 1990-94 was included into regression but not reported. Also, constant not reported.
This regression would suggest that labor taxes are not harmful for growth neither
through the unemployment channel or directly. One of the potential reasons why
high labor tax does not dampen growth may be the strong substitutability between
labor and capital. Higher labor taxes would only shift the production technology
towards more capital-intensive methods, leading into higher average labor productive
and same output. Another potential reason is that labor taxes are born by labor and
they do not a®ect the gross labor costs of the ¯rms (see eg. Kruger (2000)).Notice,
however, that insigni¯cant relationship between growth and unemployment found
in this regression does not imply that such a relationship could not exist in business
cycle frequencies. It merely suggests that the cross-country di®erences in growth
25We experimented also by dropping ¯rst the inequality from the regression to see whether
this would a®ect the signi¯cance and magnitude of the changes in unemployment. Changes in
unemployment remained insigni¯cant.
26Davidson and MacKinnon test suggests that OLS would nevertheless yield consistent estimates.
Ignoring endogeneity problem and estimating the same model with contemporaneous tax rates
and changes in unemployment rates yields highly signi¯cant coe±cient for capital tax rates. Its
magnitude (¡0:04) is also higher than the one estimated in instrumental variable method. Labor
tax rates remain negative, but insigni¯cant, but so does change in unemployment rate when we
control for the outlier of Finland.
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rates cannot be explained by the cross-country di®erences in unemployment rates
and labor income taxes.
Assuming that the taxes and unemployment a®ect on growth with lag would
suggest that the same model could be estimated with OLS, but using lagged values
of capital taxes and unemployment as explanatory variables. In such a speci¯cation,
the estimated coe±cient for capital tax rate remains fairly close to those estimated by
the instrumental variable method. Estimated coe±cient depends on whether labor
tax rates and/or change in the unemployment were included in the model. However,
in all cases, estimated coe±cient remains insigni¯cant even at 10% signi¯cance level.
In summary, we are left with somewhat inconclusive evidence on the signi¯cance
and magnitude of the distorting e®ect of taxes on growth. Whilst labor taxes do not
seem to matter directly for growth performance, there is some evidence that capital
taxes would be harmful for growth in all countries. Our di®erent speci¯cations would
suggest that this parameter remains between ¡0:01 and ¡0:04: Moreover, there is
certainly no robust evidence that changes in unemployment rate and growth would
be negatively correlated.
These results are somewhat in contrast to those reported in Daveri and Tabellini
(2000), who suggested negative and signi¯cant relationship between unemployment
and growth, but no relationship between growth and capital taxes.
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5 Conclusions
According to our results, collective bargaining a®ects the level and structure of
labor and capital taxes in OECD countries. Corporatist countries were found to
have higher labor taxes on average during the 1970-1996 period, while capital taxes
were suggested to be higher in the countries where union membership is higher.
Labor taxes were found to be correlated with unemployment only in the coun-
tries with industry level bargaining system. In the countries with competitive or
corporatist wage bargaining, labor taxes had no statistically signi¯cant e®ect on
unemployment. This would imply that reductions in labor taxes would improve
unemployment performance only in the unionized countries with decentralized wage
bargaining. Evidence on the relationship between e®ective capital taxes and growth
remained somewhat inconclusive, although some support was found for the negative
relation. Our results would not suggest a robust relationship between unemployment
and growth in cross-section model either. However, if anything, capital taxes con-
tribute negatively to growth, but there is no conclusive evidence on neither direct or
indirect e®ect of labor taxes on growth. According to our estimates, 10 percentage
point reduction in capital income tax would imply 0.1- 0.4 percentage point increase
in per-capita GDP growth, while 10 percentage point reduction in labour income
tax would imply around 2-3 percentage point decrease in unemployment rate in the
countries with industry level bargaining system.
Whilst our results provide more support on the distorting nature of labor taxes
on unemployment and emphasizes the role of wage bargaining institutions on the
causes and consequences of labor income taxation, further empirical studies are in
need. Surprisingly sensitive results regarding the empirical regularity between cap-
ital taxes and growth can be due to many reasons and certainly are worth further
research. In spite of the several econometric and measurement problems, we believe
our results cast some doubt to simple endogenous growth models with complete mar-
kets. Small or non-existent distortionary e®ects of labour and capital taxes can be
due to the potential e±ciency e®ects of redistributive taxation. Potential e±ciency
gains of redistribution are also supported by the ¯nding that inequality was found
to be harmful for growth. From purely growth enhancing perspective, however, our
result would suggest that labor taxes might be more appropriate instrument of re-
distribution than capital taxes. Labor taxes seem to lead into higher unemployment
in the countries with industry level bargaining system, but they did not appear to
have direct or indirect e®ect on growth. Based on this, it seems that consequences
of taxation on growth and unemployment need to be considered within richer the-
oretical and empirical models that account for both direct and indirect e®ects of
redistribution. Such a theoretical work has been pursued further for instance in
B¶enabou [1999], but rigorous empirical work remains to be done.
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A Data Appendix
Our data set covers periods from 1970-1996 and 18 OECD countries. In all re-
gressions, we used 5 year averages, except for the last period, where average was
calculated only from the last 2 years period. E®ective tax rates27 have been calcu-
lated by following the method of Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994). Calculation of
e®ective labor and capital tax rates is based on following formulas
¿ per =
1100
W + PEI +OSPUE
¿ l =
¿per £W + 2000 + 3000
W + 2200
¿ c =
¿per £ (OSPUE + PEI) + 1200 + 4100 + 4400
OS
where classi¯cation is according to OECD revenue and national accounts statis-
tics
CODE OECD REVENUE STATISTICS
1100 Taxes on income, pro¯ts and capital gains on individuals
1200 Taxes on income, pro¯ts and capital gains on corporations
2000 Social security contributions
2200 Social security contributions of employers
3000 Taxes on payroll and workforce
4100 Recurrent taxes on net wealth
4400 Taxes on ¯nancial and capital transactions
CODE OECD NATIONAL ACCOUNTS
OS Operating surplus of corporate and quasi-corporate enterprises
OSPUE Operating surplus of private unincorporated enterprises
W Wages and salaries
PEI Property and enterprenuerial income
² The personal income tax (¿ per) is de¯ned as the ratio of revenues from taxes
on income, pro¯ts and capital gains of individuals (1100) to the tax base that
consists of wages and salaries (W), the operating surplus of unincorporated
enterprises (OSPUE) and the property and entrepreneurial income of house-
holds(PEI)
² The labor tax (¿ l) is de¯ned as the product of the personal income tax ratio
(¿ per) and wages and salaries (W) plus total social security contributions (2000)
and taxes on payroll and workforce (3000) over the sum of wages and salaries
plus employers' social security contributions (2200).
27OECD (1999) and Carey and Tchilingurian (2000) provide a fruitfull discussion on the problems
of measuring e®ective tax rates in international comparisons and suggest some new methods.
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² The capital tax ratio (¿ c) is de¯ned as the product of the personal income tax
ratio (¿per) and the sum of the operating surplus of private unincorporated en-
terprises (OSPUE) and property and entrepreneurial income (PEI) plus taxes
on income, pro¯ts and capital gains of corporations (1200) plus taxes on prop-
erty (4100) and taxes on ¯nancial and capital transactions (4400) over the
operating surplus of the economy (OS).
² Unemployment rate is standardized unemployment rate from OECD National
Accounts
² Replacement rate is gross replacement ratio calculated as average of the gross
unemployment bene¯t replacement rates for two earnings levels, three family
situations and the three durations of unemployment as in OECD database for
bene¯t entitlements and replacement rates
² Growth rate of per capita GDP is calculated from OECD National accounts,
adjusted with dollar exchange rates and 1990 price levels.
² Indices of centralization and co-operation of wage bargaining are based on
OECD estimates of prominent bargaining level. Primary sources are OECD
(1994, 1997)
² Density rates are from OECD Employment Outlook 1997.
² Primary source of the decile ratios is OECD Employment Outlook 1996, table
3.1. The original data is extrapolated to cover periods from 1975-1995.
² Theil index is obtained from http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/
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B The model
B.1 Preliminaries
This appendix outlines a simple wage setting model, which demonstrates analytically
the externality argument arising from the ability of corporatist unions internalize
aggregate consequences of its actions. Assume that workers utility is quasilinear
with respect to disposable income and public services. Assume that employed worker
derives utility (VE) according to
VE = W (1¡ ¿) + V (G) (6)
and unemployed worker derives utility (VU) according to
VU = Wu + V (G) (7)
W is wage, Wu is unemployment bene¯t, ¿ is labour income tax, G is pub-
lic expenditure and V (:) is some concave utility fuinction associated with public
expenditure. Assume that the unemployment bene¯t is not taxable income and
assume that the government collects revenues only from labor. Government budget
constraint can be written as
G · ¿ lWN(K;W )¡ (1¡N(K;W ))Wu (8)
where N(K;W ) denotes number of employed (labour demand) as a function of
wage (W ) and capital (K):
Normalise total number of employed to 1; and assume that utilitarian trade union
maximizes Benthamian utility function (U) such that
U = NVE + (1¡N)VU
= NW (1¡ ¿ ) +NV (G) + (1¡N) (Wu + V (G)) (9)
where (1 ¡ N) denotes number of unemployed. We assume that VG = @V@G · 1
and that public good is a normal good (VG > 0).
B.2 Production
Assume the following concave production function (Y )
Y = Y (K;N) (10)
where
Y (K;N) = µ(K)N1¡® (11)
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for some concave function µ(K); µK > 0; µKK < 0, ® < 1 and where K denotes
capital. Let prices be normalized to unity. Firms labor demand is then
N =
µ
(1¡ ®) µ(K)
W
¶ 1
®
(12)
Let us express labor demand such that
N ´ N(K;W ); NW = @N
@W
< 0 (13)
B.3 Utilitarian monopoly union
Utilitarian labor union takes G and Wu and K as given and solves the following
problem
max
W
NW (1¡ ¿) + (1¡N)Wu + V (G)
s:t: (14)
N ´ N(K;W ) (15)
First order condition yields
NwW (1¡ ¿ ) + (1¡ ¿ l)N ¡NwWu = 0 (16)
)
WM =
Wu
1¡ ¿ ¡
N
Nw
Using labor demand function N =
³
(1¡®)µ(K)
W
´ 1
®
; we can express this as
WM =
Wu
(1¡ ®) (1¡ ¿) (17)
Equilibrium employment is then
NM =
µ
(1¡ ®)2 (1¡ ¿) µ(K)
Wu
¶ 1
®
(18)
Notice then immediately that,
@NM
@¿ l
= ¡ N
M
®(1¡ ¿) < 0 (19)
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B.4 Corporatist union
Corporatist union sees beyond the budget constraint of the government and solves
the following problem
max
W
NW (1¡ ¿ l) + (1¡N)Wu + V (G)
s:t: (20)
N = N(K;W )
G · ¿WN(K;W )¡ (1¡N(K;W ))Wu
Maximization yields, after some manipulations
WC =
Wu (1¡ VG)
1¡ ¿ (1¡ VG) ¡
N
Nw
(21)
As in the case of monopolistic unions we use the labor demand function to express
the equilibrium wage as
WC =
Wu (1¡ VG)
(1¡ ¿ (1¡ VG)) (1¡ ®) (22)
since
N
NW
= ¡®W (23)
In order for wage rate to be positive we assume that
VG · 1
That is, marginal utility from public good must be less than marginal utility
from private consumption. Equilibrium employment is then
NC =
µ
(1¡ ¿ (1¡ VG)) (1¡ ®)2µ(K)
Wu (1¡ VG)
¶ 1
®
(24)
Notice then that
@NC
@¿
= ¡ N
C (1¡ VG)
® (1¡ (1¡ VG) ¿) · 0 8 0 < VG · 1 (25)
and that
WC¿ =
(1¡ °VG)2Wu
(1¡ ¿ (1¡ °VG))2 (1¡ ®)
> 0 (26)
Two important propositions now be established
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Proposition 1 Monopolistic union sets always the wage higher than corporatist
union, when public good is a normal good.
Proof. It is easy to see that
WC < WM
,
Wu (1¡ VG)
(1¡ ¿ (1¡ VG)) (1¡ ®) <
Wu
(1¡ ®) (1¡ ¿ )
(1¡ VG) (1¡ ¿ )
1¡ ¿ (1¡ VG) < 1,
¡VG < 0; 8 0 < VG < 1
Proposition 2 Labor tax elasticity is smaller in corporatist economies than in
economies with monopolistically competing labor markets
Proof. It is easy to see that¯¯¯¯
@NC
@¿
¿
NC
¯¯¯¯
<
¯¯¯¯
@NM
@¿
NM
¿
¯¯¯¯
,
(1¡ VG)
1¡ (1¡ VG) <
1
1¡ ¿
,
(1¡ VG) (1¡ ¿ )
1¡ (1¡ VG) < 1,
¡VG < 0; 8 0 < VG < 1
as above.
B.5 Optimal size of the public sector
B.5.1 Utilitarian monopoly union
Assume that the government maximize size of tax revenues. Substituting WM into
the government's budget constraint gives a wage augmented budget constraint, such
that
G = ¿ lWN(K;W )¡ (1¡N(K;W ))Wu
=
µ
NM (1¡ ® (1¡ ¿))
(1¡ ®) (1¡ ¿) ¡ 1
¶
Wu (27)
where NM =
³
(1¡®)2(1¡¿)µ(K)
Wu
´ 1
®
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The revenue maximizing government would collect labor taxes until
G¿ = 0
Taking the derivative from above yields
G¿ =
(® (2¡ ¿ )¡ 1)NMWu
(1¡ ®) (¿ ¡ 1)2 ® (28)
A revenue maximizing level of labor income tax can then be solved then from
above by setting G¿ = 0. This yields
¿GM = 1¡ 1¡ ®
®
(29)
B.5.2 Corporatist union
In the corporatist labor markets, instead, wage augmented government budget con-
straint is
G =
µ
N
®¡ 1¡ ®¿ (1¡ VG)
(1¡ ¿ + ¿VG) (®¡ 1) ¡ 1
¶
Wu (30)
Derivative with respect to labour income tax yields
G¿ =
N (1¡ VG)Wu (2®¡ 1¡ ®¿ (1¡ VG))
(1¡ ¿ (1¡ VG))2 (1¡ ®)®
(31)
Solution to
G¿ = 0
yields then
¿GC =
2®¡ 1
® (1¡ VG) (32)
It is necessary to assume here that
® >
1
2
VG <
1¡ ®
®
in order for
0 < ¿GC < 1
Following proposition can then easily be established
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Proposition 3 Government's revenue maximizing labor tax is higher in corporatist
system when compared with monopolistically competing labor markets, as long as
® > :5
Proof. It is easy to see that
¿GC > ¿GM
,
VG
2®¡ 1
® (1¡ VG) > 0; 8 ® >
1
2
and VG < 1
